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I. INTRODUCTION
The "nonobviousness" standard determines how much an invention
must differ from the prior art in order to qualify for a patent.1 In theory,
this standard prevents issuance of patents on inventions that, although
new, are so close to the prior art that they are likely to be forthcoming
even without patent incentives.2 Section 103 of the Patent Act articulates
the basic standard as follows:
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for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Many legal scholars have written about the nonobviousness standard. See Martin
J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 979 (1987); John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43
IDEA 475 (2003); Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 293; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363 (2000-01); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and
Patent Standards: Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (1988); Robert P.
Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1993); Cecil
D. Quillen, Jr., Proposal for the Simplification and Reform of the United States Patent
System, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 189 (1993).
2. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) ("The inherent problem was to
develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or
devised but for the inducement of a patent."); see also Kitch, supra note 1, at 301 ("The
non-obviousness test makes an effort, necessarily an awkward one, to sort out those in-
novations that would not be developed absent a patent system."). Lunney writes:
Ideally, under this view, a patent should be given for an invention only
if the invention would not have been developed but for the patent. If the
claimed invention would have been developed, commercialized, and
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A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identi-
cally disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this ti-
tle, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.3
Read for plain meaning, this language seems to call for evaluations of
nonobviousness from the perspective of ordinary practitioners who are
contemporaries of the inventor in the relevant technological community. It
specifies a point in time as of which the obviousness of the invention
should be evaluated ("at the time the invention was made") and designates
the person whose judgment of obviousness should control ("to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains" or
PHOSITA), as well as directing attention to "the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art."
4
If the point of the nonobviousness requirement is to distinguish patent-
worthy inventions from routine advances that do not require the incentive
of a patent, this is a sensible frame of reference. An invention that seems
obvious at the time it was made to ordinary practitioners in the technologi-
cal community is likely to occur promptly to others with or without the
inventor's efforts, and the legislative choice to exclude such slight ad-
vances from patent protection seems to be a reasonable rule of thumb.5
Otherwise, consumers would endure unnecessary restrictions on competi-
tion in new technologies and competitors would feel compelled to waste
resources racing to make and patent modest incremental advances for fear
of being foreclosed by the patents of others from doing what comes easily
disclosed even without a patent, then granting or enforcing a patent
would make little sense.
Lunney, supra note 1, at 365-66.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
4. Id. § 103.
5. One criticism of this technological approach to patentability is that it ignores
research and development costs, which might deter investment in making even techno-
logically obvious inventions. Cf Barton, supra note 1, at 496 (proposing adjusting the
standard for nonobviousness "to grant a patent only if the invention is more substantial
than that regularly made by a person of average skill in the art being funded and sup-
ported in a way that is typical in the relevant industry").
[Vol. 19:885
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6to their own scientists and engineers. But the implementation of such a
standard poses certain administrative challenges.
There are two main difficulties. One difficulty, much remarked by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, concerns the time frame for mak-
ing the statutory determination. An invention that was in fact nonobvious
at the time it was made might nonetheless appear obvious by the time it is
evaluated for patentability some years later, especially to those who have
read the inventor's disclosure.7 This concern about the corruption of
judgments of nonobviousness by improper "hindsight" is a strong theme in
Federal Circuit opinions.8 Another difficulty that has received far less at-
tention is how to gain access to the perspective of ordinary practitioners in
the field of the invention. An invention that seems obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the field might nonetheless seem patentworthy to a
person who lacks such skill, even after reading the prior art record.
These two problems in the hypothetical frame of reference for making
determinations of patentability-the problem of timing and the problem of
skill level-are often conflated in judicial opinions. For example, in reject-
ing the contention that the trial court committed error by failing to make
specific findings on the level of skill in the art, the Federal Circuit ob-
served in Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc.:
The primary value in the requirement that level of skill be found
lies in its tendency to focus the mind of the decisionmaker away
from what would presently be obvious to that decisionmaker and
toward what would, when the invention was made, have been
6. As explained by one experienced patent professional: "At the end of the day
everyone has more patents and no one has gained an advantage. All have found it neces-
sary to incur higher costs." Quillen, supra note 1, at 195.
7. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging
in Hindsight, 65 U. CHii. L. REv. 571 (1998) (reviewing literature from cognitive psy-
chology that shows tendency of people to exaggerate, with the benefit of hindsight, what
could have been anticipated in foresight, and considering the implications of this "hind-
sight bias" in specific legal contexts).
8. See, e.g., In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A critical step in
analyzing the patentability of claims pursuant to section 103(a) is casting the mind back
to the time of invention, to consider the thinking of one of ordinary skill in the art, guided
only by the prior art references and the then-accepted wisdom in the field."); In re Dem-
biczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Measuring a claimed invention against the
standard established by section 103 requires the oft-difficult but critical step of casting
the mind back to the time of invention .... ).
20041
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obvious, as the statute requires, "to one of ordinary skill in the
art."' 9
In this understanding, the statutory admonition to consider nonobvious-
ness from the perspective of PHOSITA provides an additional safeguard
against hindsight and works in tandem with the admonition to evaluate
nonobviousness at the time the invention was made. But the problem of
making determinations of nonobviousness from the perspective of a
skilled practitioner is distinct from the problem of hindsight, and presents
a very different risk. The risk posed by evaluating obviousness at a later
date rather than "at the time the invention was made" is that the bar will be
set too high. The risk posed by assigning the evaluation to a decision-
maker who does not have ordinary skill in the art is that the bar will be set
too low.
While the Federal Circuit has actively scrutinized obviousness deter-
minations to detect and correct any "hindsight" bias, it has all but ignored
the statutory directive that judgments of nonobviousness be made from the
perspective of PHOSITA. Today, PHOSITA sits on the sidelines of obvi-
ousness analysis. Courts consult PHOSITA on the scope, content and
meaning of prior art references but not on the ultimate question of whether
the invention would have been obvious at the time it was made in light of
the prior art. The resulting analysis excludes from consideration the judg-
ment, intuition and tacit knowledge of ordinary practitioners in the field
that cannot be documented in the written record. The written record under-
states the technological know-how that active practitioners bring to bear
upon a problem, particularly in fields of industrial technology that offer
few incentives to publish.
The technological skill of patent examiners may provide a proxy for
the tacit knowledge of PHOSITA, but examiners are at best former practi-
tioners whose practical technological skills inevitably decline with time.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit actively discourages examiners from relying
on their own technological skill in evaluating inventions, reprimanding
them for failing to document the basis for decisions that explicitly rest
upon their own common sense.l°
9. 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he level of
skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge or jury views the prior art and the
claimed invention. This reference point prevents these deciders from using their own in-
sight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge obviousness.").
10. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("'Common knowledge and
common sense,' even if assumed to derive from the agency's expertise, do not substitute
for authority when the law requires authority.") (citation omitted); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d
[Vol. 19:885
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In this Article, I consider the possibility of giving the USPTO input
from currently active technological practitioners in evaluating the obvi-
ousness of claimed inventions. Such input could potentially serve three
useful functions. First, it could improve the accuracy of USPTO decision-
making by providing access to the perspective of actual practitioners as to
the obviousness of inventions from the perspective of the hypothetical
PHOSITA. Second, it could help the USPTO document the evidentiary
basis for rejections that rest in part upon tacit knowledge within techno-
logical communities. Third, it could provide a quality control mechanism
that would improve the credibility of USPTO decisions as to what is obvi-
ous. This mechanism should provide timely advice in a cost-effective
manner while minimizing risks of bias and conflict of interest.
II. THE DIMINISHED ROLE OF PHOSITA IN JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
Judicial decisions have assigned a far lesser role to PHOSITA in
evaluating nonobviousness than one might expect from parsing the lan-
guage of the statute. Courts have marginalized the role of PHOSITA by
presuming that PHOSITA is incapable of innovation and by treating de-
terminations of nonobviousness as conclusions of law." They have further
marginalized PHOSITA's role by enhancing the relevance of nontech-
nological evidence of nonobviousness, 12 by requiring evidence of"sugges-
tion" to combine references from the prior art to establish obviousness,'
3
and by reversing rejections that rely on "common sense" rather than ex-
plicit documentation in prior art. Rather than turning to PHOSITA for a
skilled appraisal of what would have been obvious at the time the inven-
tion was made, courts simply invoke PHOSITA's understanding to deter-
mine what the prior art references disclose and suggest, making the ulti-
mate determination of nonbviousness themselves. This approach has left
1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its
own understanding or experience--or on its assessment of what would be basic knowl-
edge or common sense."); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir 1998) (rejecting
Board's conclusion because it failed to "explain the specific understanding or principle").
11. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 705
F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Obviousness is a legal conclusion based on factual
determinations and not a factual determination itself.") (citation omitted).
12. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("'Evidence of
secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the
record."') (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
13. Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SIBIA
Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
20041
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the courts with considerable room for active judicial review. The Federal
Circuit has deployed judicial review in ways that make it harder to estab-
lish nonobviousness, diminish the role of nonobviousness in limiting what
may be patented, and reduce the threat of patent invalidity. In the process,
it has arguably disregarded the statutory language and permitted the issu-
ance of patents on routine advances within easy reach of technological
practitioners of ordinary skill.
In Graham v. John Deere Co., the U.S. Supreme Court included the
level of ordinary skill in the art in its enumeration of "several basic factual
inquiries" to be made in the course of applying the statutory standard:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be de-
termined; differences between the prior art and the claims at is-
sue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. '
4
Yet in its own application of the standard, the Court simply compared the
prior art to the claimed inventions and offered its own assessment of obvi-
ousness with no further reference to the skill level of PHOSITA.15 Subse-
quent lower court decisions, while noting that Graham calls for explicit
factual findings as to skill level, have treated the failure to make such find-
ings as harmless error.'6
Although the Federal Circuit continues to recite the level of ordinary
skill as one of the necessary findings to be made in applying the nonobvi-
ousness standard, and even acknowledges explicit findings as to skill level
in the USPTO and the District Courts, 17 these findings seem to do little
work in guiding its own review of the ultimate conclusion as to patentabil-
ity. Instead, the Federal Circuit has generally focused on the prior art ref-
erences themselves, consulting the perspective of PHOSITA only to de-
14. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
15. Nor did the Court appear to rely on any findings concerning the level of ordinary
skill in the art in its evaluation of the obviousness of the inventions at issue in its subse-
quent decisions in Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969), Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), and Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S.
273 (1976). See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.03[4][a] (2004).
16. E.g., Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting
factual inquiries described by Graham but finding "no legal error in the absence of spe-
cific findings as to the level of ordinary skill"); Contico Int'l, Inc. v. Rubbermaid Com-
mercial Prod., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 824 n.9 (8th Cir. 1981); Whitley v. Road Corp., 624
F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. E.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,




termine what those references would reveal and suggest to a trained reader
rather than to illuminate whether the invention would have seemed obvi-
ous to such a person. 18
One reason for this diminished role for PHOSITA is a judicial pre-
sumption, with little if any support in the statutory language, that
PHOSITA is an uncreative plodder, incapable of making inventions of his
own. This presumption was frankly stated by the late Judge Rich in Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.:
The statutory emphasis is on a person of ordinary skill, and one
should not go about determining obviousness under § 103 by in-
quiring into what patentees (i.e., inventors) would have known
or would likely have done, faced with the revelations of refer-
ences. A person of ordinary skill in the art is also presumed to be
one who thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art
and is not one who undertakes to innovate, whether by patient,
and often expensive, systematic research or by extraordinary in-
sights, it makes no difference which.' 9
This reading of the statute, which implies that patentees necessarily pos-
sess more than ordinary skill, inverts the relationship between the skill of
PHOSITA and the standard of nonobviousness from the reading set forth
in the introduction to this article. To Judge Rich, the skill of PHOSITA
18. E.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that the
USPTO Board did not err in relying on "lofty skill level" in the art to find that references
would be understood to disclose all of the elements of the claimed invention, but reversi-
bly erred in relying upon the high level of skill in the art to provide the necessary motiva-
tion to combine the references).
19. 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Judge Rich sometimes invoked his past role
as a drafter of the statutory language in support of his own interpretations of the language
of the Patent Act. E.g., Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J.,
concurring). Judge Rich stated in Paulik:
I write in order to express some additional thoughts respecting 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) as a member of the group which drafted that sec-
tion.... In my view, considering what I know to have been the intent
of [§ 102(g) of the Patent Act], it has been thoroughly misapplied by
the board and the dissent here.., by applying to § 102(g) a kind of
stultifying literalism... misconstruing a section which was intended to
be merely a codification of preexisting case law precedents ....
Id. (Rich, J., concurring). See generally Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent-Or, Who
Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PATENT
PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 61, 78 (1963)
(quoting a member of the patent subcommittee that held hearings on the Patent Act for
the proposition that Judge Rich and the other drafters of the statute "far more than any
member of the House or Senate, knew and understood what was intended by the language
used").
2004]
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does not establish a floor for patentable inventions; rather, it is the legal
standard for patentability that sets a ceiling for the skill level of
PHOSITA. If practitioners in a particular field tend to be innovative (or,
for that matter, to get patents), one must, apparently, consult the perspec-
tive of practitioners who have less than ordinary skill (or at least less than
average skill) in order to maintain Judge Rich's presumption that
PHOSITA "is not one who undertakes to innovate." This interpretation is
in considerable tension with the statutory language. At best, it is circular,
defining nonobviousness (and therefore patentability) by reference to the
skill level of PHOSITA, and then defining PHOSITA's skill level by ref-
erence to capacity to make patentable (that is, nonobvious) inventions. At
worst, it sets the stage for a downward spiral in which the standard of pat-
entability falls as courts exclude patentees from consideration in assessing
the skill level of PHOSITA, making it easier to obtain patents, and leading
inexorably to a further lowering of judicial expectations for PHOSITA as
yet more practitioners become patentees.
Apart from projecting low expectations onto PHOSITA, the Federal
Circuit has made a number of other moves that curtail the relevance of
PHOSITA to nonobviousness determinations. Soon after its formation, the
Federal Circuit followed the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
holding that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a legal conclu-
sion subject to plenary review on appeal, rather than a factual determina-
tion subject to a more deferential standard of review.2 0 The Supreme Court
opinion in Graham was ambiguous on this point,21 although earlier deci-
sions of the Court had generally treated the presence or absence of pat-
20. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 705
F.2d 1565, 1575 (1983).
21. The Supreme Court stated:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law ... the
§ 103 condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which
must be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; dif-
ferences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as com-
mercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the ori-
gin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965). The opinion goes on to draw an
analogy to determinations of negligence, which the courts have sensibly treated as mixed
determinations of law and fact.
[Vol. 19:885
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entable invention as a question of fact, as had some circuit court decisions
prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit.
22
Treating judgments of obviousness as unalloyed legal conclusions em-
phasizes the legal nature of the statutory standard itself, while ignoring the
factual nature of the task of applying that standard to specific cases. Inas-
much as PHOSITA has no expertise in deciding legal questions, this ap-
proach obscures the relevance of PHOSITA's views about what would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made, notwithstanding
the apparent centrality of those views under the statutory language. It also
leaves considerable room for active judicial review of the ultimate conclu-
sion, irrespective of any findings of fact concerning skill level.
The Federal Circuit has further limited the significance of PHOSITA's
views by attaching heightened importance to nontechnological evidence
when evaluating obviousness. 23 Although the statutory language defines
nonobviousness in purely technological terms, the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Graham that "[s]uch secondary considerations as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be util-
ized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject
matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobvious-
ness, these inquiries may have relevancy.', 24 The Federal Circuit has ele-
vated the status of such nontechnological evidence from the explicitly
"secondary" role posited by the Supreme Court to a position of equal dig-
nity with the primary inquiries-scope and content of the prior art, differ-
ences between the claimed invention and the prior art, and level of skill in
the art-specified in the statute itself.25 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
substituted the laudatory term "objective evidence" for the more equivocal
22. For a review of early Supreme Court cases on this question, see 2 CHISUM, su-
pra note 15, § 5.04[3][a]. See also Moore v. Shultz, 491 F.2d 294, 300 (10th Cir. 1974)
("[N]onobviousness is itself a factual question.") (citation omitted); Koppers Co. v. Fos-
ter Grant, 396 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1968) ("In this situation, although, within limits, a
question of law, the determination whether a discovery of a new combination is or is not
obvious must be a question of fact.").
23. Many commentators have remarked upon the significance of this change, in-
cluding Adelman, supra note 1, at 989, Lunney, supra note 1, at 375, and Quillen, supra
note 1, at 193.
24. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
25. E.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662-63 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (listing
Graham factors, including secondary considerations such as commercial success and
long-felt but unsolved need); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14,
26 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,
231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Indeed, evidence of secondary considerations may often be
the most probative and cogent evidence in the record.").
2004]
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"secondary evidence" in its own usage, suggesting that reception of the
invention by consumers is a more reliable indicator of its obviousness or
nonobviousness than a technological evaluation from the perspective of
PHOSITA.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has downgraded PHOSITA from the
role of skilled evaluator of obviousness that the statute seems to contem-
plate to the more limited role of skilled reader of prior art. Even within
this diminished role, the Federal Circuit has shown little confidence in
PHOSITA's ability to use what he reads. Although earlier decisions pic-
tured PHOSITA as possessing active awareness of all of the prior art and
fully capable of considering references collectively,27 the Federal Circuit
has rejected this approach in favor of a more restrictive "suggestion" test
for determining when references may be combined to establish obvious-
ness.28 Under this test, an invention consisting of multiple elements, each
of which is disclosed in a different prior art reference, is nonetheless pre-
sumed to be nonobvious absent a showing through "objective evidence of
record" of "some teaching, suggestion or motivation in the prior art to
make the specific combination that was made by the applicant., 29 This ap-
proach extends Judge Rich's presumption that PHOSITA is a conventional
thinker who is not inclined to innovate by further presuming that
PHOSITA lacks the capacity to synthesize the teachings of others on his
own. It is difficult to reconcile this approach with the Supreme Court's
admonition in Graham that the skill level of PHOSITA is a factual ques-
tion that must be resolved before determining whether an invention is ob-
vious. 30 In some fields, presumably, such a factual inquiry might reveal
that ordinary practitioners have the skill to seek and combine elements on
their own initiative without needing to be prompted by suggestion. 31
26. E.g., Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1343; In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
27. E.g., In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("We think the
proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test to a case like this is to first picture the in-
ventor as working in his shop with the prior art references-which he is presumed to
know-hanging on the walls around him.").
28. E.g., In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring that prior art pro-
vide motivation, suggestion or teaching which would lead an individual to combine the
relevant teachings of the references); In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (same);
In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (same).
29. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965).
31. Further complexities arise from decisions holding that even in the presence of
explicit suggestion in the prior art, an invention might nonetheless be nonobvious if it is
merely "obvious to try," unless the prior art affords a basis for a reasonable expectation
of success. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Although the focus on
[Vol. 19:885
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The Federal Circuit has chastised the USPTO for invoking the high
skill level32 or even "common sense' 33 of PHOSITA to explain the obvi-
ousness of an invention consisting of multiple elements that are not com-
bined in a single prior art reference. As a formal matter, the Federal Cir-
cuit has consistently acknowledged that the necessary "suggestion" to
combine elements need not be explicit in prior art references, but might
instead be found in "the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art" or
in "the nature of the problem to be solved., 34 But when the USPTO has
relied upon skill level rather than prior art to explain why the differences
between the prior art and the claimed invention would have been obvious,
the Federal Circuit has often reversed, accusing USPTO of "falling into
the hindsight trap.",35 The court's skepticism reached an apogee in the case36.
of In re Lee, in which it vacated a' rejection for obviousness that rested
on a combination of two references. Although the examiner and USPTO
Board thought that "common knowledge and common sense" would pro-
vide motivation to combine the references, the Federal Circuit held that
this approach was too conclusory to satisfy the requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act:
The Board's findings must extend to all material facts and must
be documented on the record, lest the "haze of so-called exper-
tise" acquire insulation from accountability. "Common knowl-
edge and common sense," even if assumed to derive from the
agency's expertise, do not substitute for authority when the law
requires authority .... Thus when they rely on what they assert
to be general knowledge to negate patentability, that knowledge
must be articulated and placed on the record.37
reasonable expectation of success would seem to call for an inquiry directed towards
PHOSITA, the Federal Circuit has sometimes required that the expectation of success be
documented in the prior art. See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
32. Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357-58.
33. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379,
1385 (Fed Cir. 2001).
34. Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SIBIA
Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
35. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In this case, the Examiner
and the Board fell into the hindsight trap."); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("In this case, the Board fell into the hindsight trap."); Rouffet, 149 F.3d at
1358 ("[T]his court infers that the examiner selected these references with the assistance
of hindsight. This court forbids the use of hindsight in the selection of references that
comprise the case of obviousness.") (citation omitted).
36. 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
37. Id. at 1344-45 (citations omitted).
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Recent decisions appear to retreat somewhat from this approach. The
Federal Circuit has affirmed rejections for obviousness despite gaps in
tracing the chain of inferences that support an implied "suggestion. ' 38 It
has also acknowledged that the scientific competence of examiners and
administrative patent judges might equip them to draw informed infer-
ences about the motivation that prior art would provide to PHOSITA.3 9
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has recognized that the suggestion or mo-
tivation to combine references need not be expressly stated in the prior art,
but may come from reasoning based on established scientific principles or
legal precedent.40 Each of these approaches for rejecting a claim, however,
requires "particular findings" grounded in objective evidence,4' with the
practical effect of excluding from the analysis the tacit knowledge ordi-
nary practitioners commonly possess. Once again, the effect is to divert
attention from PHOSITA's judgment and skill in evaluating inventions for
obviousness, and to refocus it upon the meaning of the prior art references.
The concern about hindsight that motivates the focus on what can be
documented in the prior art is a legitimate worry. Once one knows some-
thing, it can be a difficult mental exercise to pretend not to know it.
42
38. E.g., In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the
Board's "conclusions are cryptic, but they are supported by the record").
39. E.g., In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court in Berg stated:
As persons of scientific competence in the fields in which they work,
examiners and administrative patent judges on the Board are responsi-
b1* for making findings, informed by their scientific knowledge, as to
the meaning of prior art references to persons of ordinary skill in the art
and the motivation those references would provide to such persons. Ab-
sent legal error or contrary factual evidence, those findings can estab-
lish a prima facie case of obviousness.
Id.
40. In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (evaluating obviousness of
claimed invention by comparing it with legal precedents analyzing relationship between
invention and prior art); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (motivation to com-
bine references may come from "knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill
in the art"); In re Semaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994-95 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[W]e agree, it was
not necessary that the prior art suggest expressly or in so many words, the 'changes or
possible improvements' the inventor made. It was only necessary that he apply 'knowl-
edge clearly present in the prior art."') (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The case
law is summarized for examiners in § 2144 of the Manual of Patent Examining Proce-
dures, available on the Internet at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/docu
ments/2 100 2144.htm.
41. See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Whether the Board
relies on an express or an implicit showing, it must provide particular findings related
thereto. Broad conclusory statements standing alone are not 'evidence."').
42. See Rachlinski, supra note 7 (studying the problem of hindsight knowledge).
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Moreover, the language of § 103 explicitly points to the prior art as a
benchmark for evaluating the obviousness of the invention-"if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that ... "--and specifies that the obviousness of the invention
should be considered "at the time the invention was made." 43 Plainly, one
cannot apply the standard without comparing the invention to the prior art.
But the statutory language just as plainly specifies that the obviousness
of an invention is to be determined from the perspective of PHOSITA:
"[T]he subject matter as a whole would have been obvious ... to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
' 4
The statutory specification of whose assessment of obviousness matters
(obvious to whom?) is as essential to the evaluation as the statutory speci-
fication of the background prior art (obvious compared to what?). Indeed,
it is difficult to make sense of a nonobviousness standard that could be
applied simply by comparing the invention to the prior art without refer-
ence to some benchmark capacity for adapting the prior art to the problem
at hand, and "ordinary skill in the art" is the benchmark specified by Con-
gress.
III. WHAT PHOSITA KNOWS
Bringing this perspective to bear upon nonobviousness determinations
undoubtedly requires more than scrutinizing the prior art. Active practitio-
ners of a technology bring more to a problem than may be found in written
prior art, including training, judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledge ac-
quired through field experience. Scientific and technological work involve
the application of craft skills that are familiar to practitioners but defy ex-
plicit articulation.45 The gap between the skill of ordinary practitioners and
the written record of prior art is likely to be particularly significant in in-
43. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
44. Id. § 103.
45. As explained by Jerome Ravetz:
The craftsman works with particular objects; he must know their prop-
erties in all their particularity; and his knowledge of them cannot be
specified in a formal account. Indeed, no explicit description of a
craftsman's techniques, and of the objects on which he works, can be
more than the simplest elements of the subject. They can be useful for
the beginner, but he must develop a personal, tacit knowledge of his
objects and what he can do with them, if he is to produce good work.
Indeed, much of his technique may not even have the character of con-
scious knowledge; by experience, his hands and eyes have taught them-
selves.
JEROME R. RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 75-76 (1971).
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dustrial technology, with its prevailing culture of secrecy and few incen-
tives to publish. Even when industrial technologists disclose their work in
publications or patents, they are likely to be guarded about what they re-
veal. The written record is a poor proxy for the background such practitio-
ners would draw upon in solving problems or in evaluating the obvious-
ness of an invention.
Within the USPTO, another proxy is readily available. Patent applica-
tions are initially evaluated by examiners, and rejections are appealed to
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Patent examiners and
Board members often have considerable scientific and technical training
and may at one time have been practicing technologists. Through such
training and experience, they may have absorbed tacit knowledge of the
sort possessed by PHOSITA but not reflected in the written prior art re-
cord. This is a good reason for the Federal Circuit to defer to USPTO re-
jections of patent applications for obviousness, 46 even when the rejections
rest in part on "common sense" and judgments about how skilled practi-
tioners would connect the dots revealed in the prior art. When the Federal
Circuit scolds examiners for failing to anchor their rejections in explicit
suggestions in the prior art or in fully articulated reasoning therefrom, it
effectively excludes tacit knowledge from the evaluation and clears the
path for the issuance of patents on inventions that are within easy reach of
practitioners of ordinary skill.
If anything, the tacit knowledge of patent examiners is likely to fall be-
low that of current practitioners of the technology. Full-time examiners are
at best former practitioners who have moved on to new careers that use
very different skills. Their technological training and skills can only atro-
phy and get out of date as their skills as patent examiners grow. They will
thus have less technological skill (and therefore find fewer inventions ob-
vious) than the hpothetical PHOSITA, whose skill level is what matters
under the statute. If the USPTO is issuing patents for obvious inventions,
46. Arti Rai has argued that USPTO rejections should be entitled to greater defer-
ence than allowances because institutional incentives make it easier to allow patent appli-
cations than to reject them. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1075-77 (2003). Instead,
the Federal Circuit has done the opposite; on one hand requiring meticulous documenta-
tion by examiners of the basis for rejections, while on the other hand requiring those chal-
lenging the validity of an issued patent to establish the factual predicate for the challenge
by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
47. Of course, in most fields patent examiners are likely to be more familiar than
current practitioners with the content of prior art references because their current jobs
require examiners to read references. But familiarity with the literature should not be
confused with "ordinary skill in the art." By focusing attention upon "the differences be-
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it remains possible to challenge the validity of the patents. An issued pat-
ent enjoys a presumption of validity48 but a defendant charged with in-
fringement may nonetheless avoid liability by proving that the invention
was obvious to a PHOSITA at the time it was made. This provides another
opportunity to introduce the perspective of practitioners of ordinary skill
in evaluating the obviousness of an invention. The defendant can offer tes-
timony of an expert witness who will review the prior art and explain why
it would have made the invention obvious, and the patent owner will pre-
dictably counter with its own expert telling the opposite story. But while
this adversarial exchange of expert testimony might afford an extensive
evidentiary record in support of a conclusion of either obviousness or
nonobviousness, it is unlikely to yield a dispassionate technological as-
sessment of the invention. By this point the stakes are high, the experts
know who hired them, and the adversarial setting is more likely to polarize
opinions and distort evidence than to reveal how the invention would have
seemed at the time it was made to the inventor's contemporaries in the
technology community. Moreover, the Federal Circuit requires that the
facts underlying a holding of invalidity for an issued patent be shown by
clear and convincing evidence,49 an extraordinary burden in civil litigation
that may be difficult to meet with opinion testimony based upon tacit
knowledge. 50 The possibility of showing obviousness through expert tes-
timony in infringement litigation is unlikely to correct for deficiencies in
the evidentiary basis for the initial determination of nonobviousness in the
USPTO.
IV. CONSULTING PHOSITA
A better mechanism for bringing the perspective of PHOSITA to bear
upon obviousness determinations would be to permit the USPTO to con-
sult with outside technology practitioners at an earlier stage in the process.
Such a mechanism could supplement the expertise of examiners by giving
them access to the actual knowledge of current practitioners, including
tween the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art," the statutory standard
necessarily presumes that the hypothetical PHOSITA is familiar with the prior art, but it
does not stop there. It goes on to attribute "ordinary skill in the art" to the hypothetical
evaluator.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
49. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461,1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
50. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm., 225 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("The record does not contain substantial evidence in support of Dr. Rodriguez' conclu-
sion that it would have been obvious to make this change.... At this critical point in the
determination of obviousness, there must be factual support for an expert's conclusory
opinion.").
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tacit knowledge. It would permit the USPTO to document the obviousness
of inventions that are not disclosed or explicitly suggested in prior art, but
that are nonetheless obvious to one with the skills and tacit knowledge of
PHOSITA. Moreoever, this mechanism could be especially valuable in
arts that are relatively new entrants into the patent system, such as com-
puter-implemented inventions and business methods, for which the written
record is a particularly inadequate approximation of the actual knowledge
of PHOSITA.
The USPTO does not have any procedures for consulting the judgment
of current technological practitioners when applying patentability stan-
dards prior to the issuance of patents. Although third parties may submit to
the USPTO written citations to prior patents and printed publications with
a bearing on patentability "at any time"51 and request reexamination of a
patent on the basis of such prior art,52 the statute explicitly prohibits "pro-
test or other form of pre-issuance opposition" while a patent application is
pending unless the applicant gives written consent. 53 The USPTO has im-
plemented this statutory directive in a rule that permits third parties to
submit patents and printed publications relevant to a pending published
patent application during a two-month window, but forbids the inclusion
of "any explanation of the patents or publications, or any other informa-
tion.",54 Thus, these provisions limit third-party participation to written
prior art references and leave no room for showing the skills or tacit
knowledge of PHOSITA.55 Moreover, the input that these provisions are
likely to generate comes from interested parties rather than disinterested
representatives of the technological community.
In contrast to the USPTO, most federal agencies charged with admin-
istering legal standards that turn on scientific or technical determinations
have mechanisms in place for consulting the judgments of outside experts,
including scientific advisory boards and peer review mechanisms. 56 Some-
times mandated by Congress and sometimes implemented voluntarily as a
51. 35 U.S.C. § 301.
52. Id. § 302.
53. Id. § 122(c).
54. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(d) (2004).
55. The USPTO has offered alternative proposals for amending the patent laws to
provide for a more robust system of post-grant review of patent claims as part of its 21st
Century Strategic Plan. The overall plan is posted at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/strat2 1 /stratplan 03feb2003.pdf, and the specific action paper on post-grant review
is posted at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2l/action/sr2.htm [hereinafter
USPTO PLAN].




matter of agency discretion, these mechanisms take a variety of forms and
have been subject to a variety of criticisms. At their best, these mecha-
nisms provide agencies with a quality control check on the scientific basis
for controversial decisionmaking, and thereby fortify the technocratic
claims of agency staff to autonomy and deference. The George W. Bush
Administration recently underscored the importance of peer review of the
scientific basis for agency decisions through release of a Proposed Bulletin
on Peer Review and Information Quality.57
Criticism of agency peer review has highlighted some hazards to con-
sider in adapting peer review to the needs of the patent system. Peer re-
view inevitably delays administrative response times and adds to the bur-
den of inertia confronting those who seek government action. In some
contexts, critics have charged that scientific review cloaks in scientific
garb what are ultimately political choices made in the face of scientific
uncertainty.59 Many commentators have noted that peer review is prone to
conflict of interest and reinforces bias in favor of orthodox views.
60
Concerns about delays and conflict of interest seem more pertinent to
the challenge of providing peer input to the USPTO on determinations of
obviousness than concerns about cloaking political choices in scientific
garb or about reinforcing bias in favor of orthodox views. Obviousness
determinations involve evaluations of past technological accomplishments
rather than predictions of future consequences, leaving somewhat less
room for distortion on the basis of politics or scientific orthodoxy. Sheila
Jasanoff has suggested that peer review is better at "cementing consensus
among scientists of similar disciplinary training and outlook" than it is at
resolving scientific uncertainty or disagreement about political choices.
61
57. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, PROPOSED BULLETIN ON PEER REVIEW
AND INFORMATION QUALITY (2003) [hereinafter OMB PEER REVIEW BULLETIN], at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peerreviewand-infoquality.pdf.
58. See OMB Watch's Response to OMB's Peer Review Bulletin (Aug. 29, 2003),
at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/1771/-1/1.
59. E.g., JASANOFF, supra note 56, at 59-60 (describing demands for peer review of
the basis for EPA risk regulation from industry and the Reagan administration during the
1980s).
60. E.g., Fiona Godlee & Kay Dickersin, Bias Subjectivity, Chance, and Conflict of
Interest in Editorial Decisions, in PEER REVIEW IN HEALTH SCIENCES 57-78 (Fiona
Godlee & Tom Jefferson eds., 1999) [hereinafter PEER REVIEW IN HEALTH SCIENCES]:
Christine Wennerfs & Agnes Wold, Bias in Peer Review of Research Proposals, in PEER
REVIEW IN HEALTH SCIENCES, supra, at 79-89; David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical
Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990).
61. JASANOFF,supra note 56, at 62.
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This observation suggests that the identification of obvious inventions is a
task for which peer review is relatively well suited.
Nonetheless, several features of the patent system complicate the task
of developing a suitable mechanism. 62 First, the USPTO makes decisions
involving an extraordinarily broad range of technologies in comparison to
the decisions made by other agencies such as the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This
makes it much harder to put together a scientific advisory board with the
right technological expertise to render timely advice. Second, the USPTO
makes many small decisions, most of which ultimately have little impact,
rather than a small number of high-impact decisions. 63 The time and ex-
pense of securing external evaluations for all USPTO decisions would be
huge, and given that the majority of patents cover technologies that are
never used, licensed, or litigated, it is hard to justify the expense.64 It is
difficult to identify ex ante the relative handful of decisions that will prove
significant enough to warrant costly review.65 Third, the legally-mandated
confidentiality of pending patent applications might require deferral of
disclosure to outsiders for at least 18 months after filing, and perhaps until
issuance of a patent if the applicant is not seeking patent protection outside
the United States. 66 Patent applicants from industry might legitimately
worry about competitive harm from premature disclosure of their inven-
tions to other practitioners. Even worse, a practitioner who works (or con-
sults) for a competing firm might have a material interest in advising the
USPTO to reject a patent claim despite (or even because of) its technical
merits.
These features of USPTO decisions suggest parallels to two other peer
review systems that differ in significant respects from the scientific advi-
62. The USPTO currently has no such mechanism in place. Although the USPTO
has a Public Advisory Committee for Patents, the members of this group are for the most
part lawyers and the matters upon which it advises the agency concern broad matters of
policy rather than specific technical issues. 35 U.S.C. § 5 (2000); USPTO, Public Advi-
sory Members, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/notices/members.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 2004) (posting membership roster).
63. Cf. OMB PEER REVIEW BULLETIN, supra note 57, at 9-11 (setting a threshold for
triggering additional peer review requirements of "especially significant regulatory in-
formation" for decisions "with a possible impact of more than $100 million in any year").
64. Cf Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1508-11 (2001) (arguing that ex ante measures to weed out bad patents are unlikely
to be worth the expense).
65. F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3-21 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 122.
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sory boards used by some federal agencies: peer review of submitted arti-
cles for scientific journals and peer review of grant proposals for sponsors.
In contemplating the available options for introducing peer review into the
USPTO, it might be instructive to consider the mechanisms used for these
other systems and the criticisms that have been directed at them.
Journal peer review comes closest to approximating the challenge that
the USPTO would face in gathering outside advice across a broad techno-
logical terrain. Although some scientific journals are narrowly specialized,
some high-impact journals such as Science and Nature cover a broad
range of subject matter. The editors of these journals need to draw upon
diverse outside expertise to review and evaluate the claims made in sub-
mitted manuscripts. 67 Rather than turning to standing committees of out-
side advisors who meet and deliberate as a group, journal editors typically
select individuals to consider particular manuscripts on an ad hoc basis.
Typically the reviewers know the identity of authors, but the reviewers
themselves remain anonymous. Reviewers may recommend acceptance,
rejection, or revisions to improve the manuscript.69 Editors retain substan-
tial control of the entire process, selecting reviewers, collecting their re-
sponses, and making other editorial decisions.7 °
There is a burgeoning literature on journal peer review.71 Criticisms of
journal peer review include that it is costly, slow, and subject to bias and
conflict of interest.72 Yet journal peer review remains widespread in scien-
67. Cf John Burnham, The Evolution of Editorial Peer Review, 263 JAMA 1323,
1324 (1990) ("Peer reviewing, in fact, developed in situations in which an editor or edi-
tors lacked the specialized knowledge that would have permitted them to make decisions
about highly technical articles.").
68. DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW
AND U.S. SCIENCE POLICY 91-95 (1990) [hereinafter CHUBIN & HACKETT].
69. Greg Myers has compared this process to the negotiations between patent appli-
cant and examiner over the scope of claim language. Greg Myers, Texts as Knowledge
Claims: The Social Construction of Two Biology Articles, 15 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 593-630
(1985). The statutory prohibition against introduction of new matter into a patent disclo-
sure would seem to be a significant distinction between the two processes. 35 U.S.C.
§ 132(a).
70. CHUBIN & HACKETT, supra note 68, at 89, 92-94.
71. See, e.g., CHUBIN & HACKETT, supra note 68; STEPHEN LOCK, A DIFFICULT
BALANCE: EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW IN MEDICINE (1985); PEER REVIEW IN HEALTH
SCIENCES, supra note 60. Many papers on peer review were generated for a series of in-
ternational conferences on peer review organized by the Journal of the American Medical
Association and published in special issues of 287 JAMA 21 (2002); 280 JAMA 3
(1998); 272 JAMA 2 (1994); 263 JAMA 10 (1990).
72. Drummond Rennie, Editorial Peer Review: Its Development and Rationale, in
PEER REVIEW IN HEALTH SCIENCES, supra note 60, at 3-13.
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tific publication and is widely considered a sine qua non for credibility
and professionalism in scientific work.
Grant peer review systems, in keeping with the missions of research
sponsors, tend to be more narrowly focused scientifically. Although de-
tails vary from one sponsor to the next, grant peer review systems often
bring reviewers together to discuss grant proposals and to make recom-
mendations for funding.73 As with editorial peer review, the sponsor re-
tains considerable control through the selection of reviewers and the reten-
tion of discretion to choose which proposals to fund. Grant peer review
has been less studied than editorial peer, although it has provoked similar
criticisms.74 Grant peer review has been further criticized for bias against
unorthodox approaches and ideas and in favor of scientists and institutions
that already have established reputations.
Because judgments about obviousness are supposed to proceed from
the perspective of ordinary practitioners who are steeped in orthodox
views, the worry about peer review involving bias against unorthodox ap-
proaches seems inapposite in this context. (If anything, conventional
thinking by patent peer reviewers should make them more easily im-
pressed with the nonobviousness of unorthodox inventions, working in
favor of those who take new technological approaches.) On the other
hand, introducing peer review into the patent system could present a sig-
nificant risk that conflict of interest will infect judgments about patentabil-
ity.
Current practitioners are more likely to share the perspective of
PHOSITA than past practitioners, whose expertise would likely overlap
with that of the USPTO examiners. But current practitioners are especially
likely to have conflicts of interest, particularly if they are working in the
same industry as the patent applicant. This concern argues for a transpar-
ent process in which the identities of reviewers are disclosed 76 and review
is deferred until applications have become public. It might also be better
managed in a process that brings multiple reviewers together to deliberate
73. CHUBIN & HACKETT, supra note 68, at 19-24.
74. Id. at 28-43; Simon Wessely & Fiona Wood, Peer Review of Grant Applica-
tions: A Systematic Review, in PEER REvIEW IN HEALTH SCIENCES, supra note 60, at 14-
27.
75. See, e.g., Gilbert W. Gillespie, Jr., et al., Experience with NIH Peer Review:
Researcher Cynicism and Desire for Change, 10 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 44
(1985); Rustum Roy, Funding Science: The Real Defects of Peer Review and an Alterna-
tive to It, 10 ScI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 73 (1985).
76. Cf OMB PEER REVIEW BULLETIN, supra note 57, at 4-5 (arguing for a transpar-
ent peer review process to enhance the credibility of peer review of regulatory science).
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and advise the USPTO about categories of patent applications rather than
relying upon individual evaluations that are independently rendered and
privately submitted to the agency.
77
The task confronting the patent system is not to select the most worthy
technologies for reward, but simply to determine whether claimed inven-
tions would have been obvious at the time they were made to PHOSITA.
Although most peer review systems seek to enlist the expertise of recog-
nized leaders in the field, less distinguished practitioners might be better
suited to the task of inhabiting the perspective of a hypothetical
PHOSITA. This should enlarge the universe of practitioners who could
serve, but the diminished distinction associated with service might none-
theless make it harder to recruit reviewers.78 It may be necessary (or pru-
dent) to compensate reviewers for their service, perhaps under agreements
that make them temporary employees of the government. The risk of rely-
ing upon volunteers would be that the ranks of those willing to serve
would tend to be dominated by those with ulterior motives of defeating the
patents of competitors.
V. CONCLUSION
In contrast to other agencies that make decisions at the cutting edge of
science and technology, the USPTO has no mechanisms in place for con-
sulting the judgment of currently active scientific and technological practi-
tioners before it acts. The special needs and challenges of the patent sys-
tem would undoubtedly call for modifications in established peer review
mechanisms to develop a suitable model. Plainly, outside review of every
patent application would not be cost-effective. In selected areas, however,
outside review of categories of claims might be a useful source of infor-
mation and validation for the USPTO in support of judgments that the Pat-
ent Act mandates be made from the perspective of persons having ordi-
nary skill in the art. The goal should be to provide the USPTO with input
from current technological practitioners at a relatively early stage in the
process through a mechanism that yields disinterested advice as to what is
obvious. 79 This input will supplement the disclosures of written prior art
77. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 56, at 160-65 (describing successful experience
of FDA Cardio-Renal Committee in deliberating upon guidelines for a product class, in
which committee members functioned more as a team of consultants with different per-
spectives to offer and avoided adversarial conflict).
78. See, e.g., Rennie, supra note 72, at 8 ("Reviewers appreciate being recognized
as experts and drawn into the academic body.").
79. This proposal is different from pending recommendations from the USPTO, the
FTC, and the National Academies of Science to amend the statute to provide for post-
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references, providing a window into the tacit knowledge of contemporary
practitioners and documenting the obviousness of inventions in fields
where patents and printed publications understate the knowledge that
PHOSITA would likely bring to a problem.
Although the mechanism would need to be designed with care to avoid
violating the statutory confidentiality of unpublished patent applications
and the prohibition against protest or pre-issuance oppositions after publi-
80cation, a potentially more serious obstacle lies not in the statute, but in
the caselaw. Despite statutory direction to evaluate obviousness from the
perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art, the Federal Circuit
has long relegated PHOSITA to a subsidiary role in evaluating the nonob-
viousness of inventions. If PHOSITA is presumed to be an unimaginative
literalist who can only read the prior art and do what it explicitly suggests,
there is little point in consulting actual practitioners to determine what
would be obvious to such a person. But if, as recent decisions suggest, the
Federal Circuit is willing to look outside the written record of prior art to
evaluate the obviousness of an invention, then perhaps the time is ripe to
explore new mechanisms for documenting the tacit knowledge of practi-
tioners of ordinary skill.
grant review of issued patents. See FED'L TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 7-8 (2003) (Recommendation 1), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf, reprinted in 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 861, 869-70 (2004); NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCIS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 78-83 (Stephen A. Merrill et
al. eds., forthcoming 2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107.html;
USPTO PLAN, supra note 55 (Post-Grant Review of Patent Claims). Each of those rec-
ommendations provides for enhanced participation by parties with vested interests in de-
feating patent claims and allows those challenges to be brought before the USPTO rather
than in litigation.
80. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122(a), (c) (2000).
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